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Challenges and Opportunities for Sharing Threat
Information with Radioactive Materials
Operators

Raphaël Duguay
Senior Security Advisor, Nuclear Security Division
Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC)

“All that is necessary for the triumph of evil is that good men do nothing.” Edmond Burke

Abstract
Operators are required to implement security measures to address requirements set by the regulatory
body or competent authority. These security requirements are generally based on the national threat
level and information provided by the relevant law enforcement authority, intelligence agencies, and
other relevant stakeholders. However, not all States can share this information with those who hold
radioactive materials (e.g., operators), especially if they take a more prescriptive approach to regulation
on security. The same situation often exists when a performance-based approach is used because there
are multiple barriers that restrict the competent authority from sharing threat information. For
example, competent authorities need to protect confidentiality and comply with national laws,
regulations, and other information security considerations. In this paper, the author presents some
challenges and opportunities relevant to exchanging threat information. The objective is to reflect on
current practices, including good practices at the state and operator levels, to facilitate cooperation
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between regulatory bodies and operators. The purpose is to increase awareness about the threats and
techniques used by adversaries and to assist stakeholders in maintaining vigilance without
compromising the security and confidentiality of the information.

1. Introduction
When protecting high-risk radioactive materials against malicious actors, it is important to implement
security measures that are based on threats and potential consequences following a graded approach in
relation to the overall level of risk. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has developed a set
of recommendations and guidance documents to help Member States develop and implement a nuclear
security regime to adequately manage the safety and security of radioactive materials. Based on the
IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources (“The Code of Conduct”) [1],
every state should define its domestic threats and assess their vulnerability with respect to the various
materials used in the country. However, there are several challenges in sharing threat information.
Some of these issues are related to confidentiality, the need to protect national security or trade
secrets, and compliance with national privacy laws, regulations, policies, and directives. In addition,
there are legal protection concerns such as copyrights, trademarks, and the general fear of losing
control of the information. To share this type of sensitive information, the competent authority needs
the consent of the owner as well as assurances from the receiver that they will not disclose this
information without proper authorization. This last criterion often is harder to achieve because
organizations need to develop and implement contractual arrangements and maintain trusting
relationships will the relevant stakeholders. Therefore, it takes time, human and financial resources, and
the will to work in collaboration with other stakeholders. In this paper, the author presents some
challenges and opportunities to facilitate sharing threat information between regulatory bodies and
operators. The objective is to enhance and strengthen awareness on current and evolving threats and
techniques used by adversaries and to assist stakeholders in being better prepared to address the
threats without compromising national security and confidentiality.
This paper focuses on the nuclear industry, and in particular, operators that use, store, and transport
high-risk radioactive materials. It excludes nuclear power plants and other high security nuclear facilities
because these operators usually have more resources to assess threats to their facilities and operations
as well as established communication networks with government organizations, law enforcement
agencies, and other intelligence security services. In this paper, the author assumes that the regulatory
body is involved in the development of the domestic threat statement for the variety of radioactive
materials used within its territory.

2. Definitions from IAEA Nuclear Security Series
•

•

Representative threat statement (RTS): A description of the motivations, intentions, and
capabilities of potential adversaries that are less rigorous and formal than the approach used to
establish a design basis threat [2].
Competent authority: A governmental organization or institution that has been designated by a
state to carry out one or more nuclear security functions. For example, competent authorities
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•

•

•

•

•

include regulatory bodies, law enforcement, customs and border control, intelligence and
security agencies, and health agencies [3].
Design basis threat (DBT): A comprehensive description of the motivations, intentions, and
capabilities of potential adversaries against which protection systems are designed and
evaluated [4].
Sensitive information: Information, in whatever form, including software, that the unauthorized
disclosure, modification, alteration, destruction, or denial of use of could compromise nuclear
security [5].
Threat assessment: An evaluation of the threats — based on available intelligence, law
enforcement, and open material information — that describes the motivation, intentions, and
capabilities of these threats [3].
Threat statement: A document that summarizes the threat assessment and has been modified
to account for policy considerations. The DBT is an example of a threat statement (developed
after extensive consultation in Member States) [6].
Threat information: To the extent the threat information is provided by the regulatory body, it
describes the information in sufficient detail to indicate how the security system is designed to
protect against both external and internal threats. Also indicates who is responsible for receiving
threat information and how such information is shared with operator personnel who have a
need to know [4].

In this paper, the term “threat information” expands to include details about potential terrorist groups,
criminals, or insiders that have the intent and/or are capable of conducting a malicious act with
radioactive materials. This may include, for example:

•
•
•
•

relevant information on the modus operandi or previous malicious acts
lessons learned from security events or incidents
security events or security information reported from competent authorities to operators and
from operators to competent authorities
guidance to enhance readiness and situational awareness of users, operators, and/or security
personnel

3. International Threat Assessment Methods for
Radioactive Materials
This section describes practices recommended by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for
conducting threat assessments for radioactive materials and how threat information may be integrated
into regulatory frameworks.

The Code of Conduct [1], the IAEA Nuclear Security Series (NSS) No. 14 Nuclear Security
Recommendations on Radioactive Material and Associated Facilities [3], and the revised IAEA NSS No. 11
Security of Radioactive Materials [4] mention that the Member State can use a domestic or national
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threat assessment to determine credible motivations, intentions, and the capabilities of potential
adversaries that could cause harm through the sabotage of a facility or the unauthorized removal of a
radioactive material for malicious purposes. The State is responsible for undertaking the task of
conducting a threat assessment. Different methods exist for assessing the threats at a strategic,
operational, and tactical level. However, there is not an international standard or agreed minimum level
of threat. Also, there is not a common international threat assessment method regarding international
transport for high-risk radioactive materials. Because the responsibility for nuclear security rests entirely
with the State, threats during international shipments of radioactive materials are harder to assess and
must be considered in the shipment risk assessment. The responsibility for this risk assessment usually
falls on the operator and must be verified and validated by the relevant competent authorities.

The information from the Threat Assessment can be used by a competent authority, such as a regulatory
body, during the development, implementation, and maintenance of the security regulations and
requirements for radioactive materials. However, this threat information is usually not specific to
facilities and sometimes is too generic to provide relevant and useful information to operators
responsible for physical protection programs at facilities and for transport.

Typically following a threat assessment, the Competent Authority will develop a design basis threat
(DBT) to protect nuclear material and nuclear facilities. The DBT is a rigorous process that includes
consultation with multiple organizations. It provides threat information on the motivation, capabilities,
modus operandi, and tools used by a potential external and/or insider adversary. Implementing a DBT
for radioactive materials requires more resources and is difficult to maintain for countries that are in the
process of developing their regulations and have limited resources. The DBTs are considered a classified
document by national competent authorities; therefore, it cannot easily be shared with private
organization operators without proper information security arrangements, nondisclosure agreements,
contractual arrangements, or an equivalent safeguard.
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In the proposed revision of NSS No. 11, the IAEA
recognizes the existence of Representative Threat
Statements (RTS). An RTS follows a similar process as
the DBT but is more flexible. In both approaches, the
DBT and RTS could be used in developing regulatory
security requirements for radioactive materials and
could achieve the same goal. Figure 1 shows how
threat information is used to define requirements for
security systems.

In both cases, there are also commonalities in using
threat information to characterize the credible threats.
For example, both DBTs and the RTS use a threat
matrix or threat profiles. The difference is that a state
may decide to use a DBT for nuclear materials and an
RTS for other radioactive materials. The DBT can be
used to protect materials and the RTS for lower risk
materials. Also, during their development process,
both documents may involve different organizations
that are more relevant to the type of material.
According to the IAEA, an RTS is typically used to
develop a more prescriptive regulatory approach and
requirements. The RTS is also considered to follow a
less rigorous process.

Figure 1: IAEA Revised NSS 11 Process for Using Threat Information

Figure 2 is an example of a generic table of attributes
and characteristics for hypothetical threats based on
IAEA guidance documents and is not to be taken as a
true illustration.

Description of attributes and characteristics

Motivation

Political, financial, ideological, personal

Terrorist
group X

Criminal Group
Y

Activists/

Political

Financial

Ideological/

Demonstrators
Group Z

Political
Level of
commitment

Disregard for personal health, safety, well-being, or
survival (Choose from low to high.)

High

Medium

Low

Intentions

Unauthorized removal, material or facility
sabotage, public panic and disruption, political
instability, mass injuries and casualties, loss of

Sabotage and
theft

Theft

Disruption of
activities, media
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reputation, unavailability of facilities,
demonstrations (choose theft and/or sabotage)

attention, business
reputation

Group size

Attack force, coordination, support

5-8

8-10

10-20

Weapons

Types, numbers, availability, improvised

Semiautomatics,
handguns,
explosives

Handguns,
knives

Handheld tools,
banners

Tools

Mechanical, thermal, manual, power, electronic,
electromagnetic, communications equipment

Power tools,

Power tools,

hand-held
tools

hand-held tools

Hand-held tools,
masks, backpacks

Modes of transport

Land, water, air; type, number, availability

Land, 4 x 4

Land, 4 x 4

Land, 4 x 4, rental
truck

Technical skills

Engineering, use of explosives and chemicals,
radiation protection, communication skills

Basic,
explosives

Basic

Basic knowledge of
radiation
protection

Computer skills

Skills to compromise computer systems and
components and the availability, integrity, and
confidentiality of the data processed, stored, or
forwarded in computer systems and components

Low

Medium

High (hacking
likely)

Knowledge

Targets, site plans and procedures, security
measures, safety and radiation protection
procedures, operations, potential use of radioactive
material

Low

Medium

Low

Funding

Material, amount, availability

$10,000

unknown

Low, under
$10,000

Insider issues

Collusion, passive/active, violent/nonviolent,
number of insiders

Support structure

Local sympathizers, support organization, logistics

Tactics

Covert and overt

Collusion,
passive insider
Unknown

Both

Collusion,
passive/active
insider

Collusion with
passive insider

Medium, local
sympathizers

International

Covert

Both

fund-raising
website

Figure 2: Generic Table of Attributes and Characteristics for Hypothetical Threats based on IAEA NSS 14 and 11

When developing security requirements for radioactive materials, a state may use a prescriptive
approach, and the regulatory body may impose security requirements without sharing threat
information with operators. A state may also wish to implement a performance-based approach where
the responsibility of defining the threat and implementing mitigating measures is mostly on the
operator. In this case, the operator has to submit their proposal to the competent authority and/or
regulatory body for their approval. Operators are responsible to gather threat information from open
materials, records of incidents, and from local police forces regarding local crime, past incident reports,
or other sources of information. This can be a challenge for operators that do not have access to threat
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information and have limited resources. Finally, States may choose to adopt a combined performance
and prescriptive approach to protect radioactive materials. In all approaches, using threat information is
a common vector, but there are challenges in sharing this information that will be explored in the
following section.

4. Challenges for Sharing Threat Information
This section explores challenges for acquiring and sharing threat information between the different
stakeholders, starting from the regulatory body to the operators’ level.

A.

National Sovereignty and National Security

Information regarding threats to national security is usually treated as sensitive and classified
information under national laws relevant to public safety and national security. External stakeholders,
such as an operator’s staff, find it difficult to acquire threat information from the competent authority
(e.g., national intelligence service, law enforcement agencies, regulatory body, etc.) because
government rules for security clearance and requirements for handling secure information are not the
same for the operators. The necessary level of security clearance, trustworthiness verification, and/or
criminal background check required by national security regulations are directly related to the capability
to receive, manage, and disseminate classified information on threats to radioactive materials.

In addition to these difficulties, some countries have conducted sabotage studies, vulnerability
assessments, and other sensitive research on radioactive material attractiveness that cannot be shared
with stakeholders because of their confidentiality. These studies identify weaknesses and vulnerabilities
and are classified to maintain national security and protect global security.

B.

Legal Provisions, Privacy Laws, and Regulations

National laws and regulations on information security usually dictate how to label, classify, and manage
information for government agencies and other competent authorities. These requirements apply to
public organizations but not necessarily to operators using radioactive materials. In some States, there
are legal provisions for copyright protection, trademarks, and intellectual property that can pose
additional barriers for sharing information.

Privacy laws and regulations can restrict the disclosure of private information with other organizations.
All organizations are required to protect private information and implement protective measures to
meet legal and regulatory requirements.

C.

Administrative Arrangements

To protect threat information and maintain a trusting relationship among public and private
organizations, contractual or written agreements are implemented between the parties for sharing
sensitive information. Organizations may be required to implement memoranda of understanding and
nondisclosure agreements as part of these arrangements. In addition, the competent authority or
regulators must get consent from the owner of the information, usually a law enforcement organization,
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before sharing it with private sector operators. These administrative and bureaucratic arrangements
take effort and time to develop, implement, and maintain. They can slowdown the process for sharing
timely sensitive threat information among stakeholders.

D.

Other Barriers and Challenges

Challenges may also exist in sharing threat information within an organization. This can be caused by
compartmentalization of classified information, business silos, poor security culture, and inadequate
integration of security threats and risks in the organizational structure and the management decision
process.

For small companies or public facilities like hospitals or universities, the operators may not have
adequate resources to assess their threat environment and integrate this information in their physical
protection program. Other challenges include:
•

•
•

•

•
•
•

•

The presence of “optimism bias” contributes to the perception that this (i.e., threat to
radioactive materials) won’t happen to “us,” making these additional efforts is not worth it or
necessary.
Public sector operators, such as universities, hospitals and medical facilities, have a strong
organizational structure of transparency.
Sharing information specific to one organization and compartmentalizing intelligence
information with another: In some cases, the competent authority may decide to share threat
information with one operator and not the entire industry to protect ongoing investigations and
avoid spreading confidential information.
Over-classification of information results from the absence of guidance on classification and
inconsistent handling requirements. Also, data or information deemed classified by one
organization may be considered unclassified by another due to subjectivity or misinterpretation
of classing rules.
Cleared individuals may lack experience in handling sensitive/confidential information resulting
in them not understanding how to manage this information.
A security clearance from one operator may not be compatible with the standard and
requirements from another operator.
The increasing use of the internet, emails, and electronic storage media and the need to protect
confidentiality in a more digital environment is becoming more complex and expensive for some
organizations.
The lack of security culture and awareness on how to handle classified and sensitive information

According to Morris et al. (2013) [7], there appear to be several reasons for the failure to fully
appreciate the threats, including:
•

The lack of a precedent leads to the assumption of low risk threat: “No one has successfully
stolen a radioactive material and used it in a dirty bomb in a given state (or sabotaged a
radioactive material in place).”
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•

•
•

In a state without a nuclear program, there may be no institutional infrastructure or familiarity
with the applicable analytical methods to conduct a national threat assessment, design basis
threat, or equivalent threat definition for radioactive materials.
States which lack a significant domestic terrorist movement may simply adopt the view that “it
can’t happen here.”
A common perception is that radioactive materials are self-protecting – an inaccurate view given
the increase in suicidal terrorist attacks and the willingness of potential adversaries to accept a
lethal radiation dose and that such lethal doses may not be sufficiently incapacitating to prevent
theft or sabotage. There is a misbelief that radiation is a deterrent and helps to prevent
unauthorized removal because it will incapacitate the adversary. This statement is false, since
malicious actors are ready to sacrifice their lives to conduct their attacks and that the radiation
dose they may get will not immediately incapacitate them.

In addition to these challenges, the amount of effort and resources needed to share classified
information with radioactive material operators is significant. It usually deters an organization’s leaders
from investing in human and financial resources because there are no data on the return on investment
and how it can benefit the organization. It is also hard to measure the effectiveness of these programs,
and there is little research or studies on their impacts. Fortunately, there are opportunities for
implementing a collaborative framework with industry to share threat information. There are also good
practices between public and private organizations that strengthen vigilance and information sharing. In
the next section, we will explore opportunities and share some good practices that can facilitate the
sharing of classified information.

5. Opportunities to Facilitate Sharing of Threat
Information
There are multiple benefits in establishing a collaborative framework for exchanging information
between public and private organizations.

Benefits
Nuclear Regulator

Radioactive Material Operators

Increases communications and information
sharing with industry representatives

Increases awareness of potential threats to
operations

Assists in establishing a trusting relationship

Increases vigilance

Encourages reporting of suspicious events

Provides additional information that can be used
to influence decision makers or enhance security
measures

Establishes more cooperation mechanism with
relevant stakeholders

Provides additional material that could be used in
training, drills, and exercises
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Figure 3: Table of Direct Benefits

Figure 3 identifies direct benefits for the regulator and the operators. There are also indirect benefits,
such as increasing networking among security points of contacts, establishing cooperation against
common threats or security issues, and increasing the knowledge and awareness of participants. The
table excludes law enforcement agencies, custom border services, and security intelligence
organizations since they already have established networks and mechanisms with private organizations
to share threat information, including reporting of suspicious events. This is typically part of their
intelligence mandate.

Some of the barriers identified in section B cannot be easily changed because they are linked to national
sovereignty. Privacy laws and regulations, legal provisions, national security directives, and policies have
to be followed when handling classified information to protect the confidentiality, availability, and
integrity of the information. Therefore, compliance with these rules is required and should set the
foundation of all cooperation and coordination arrangements between the public and private
organizations.

To overcome institutionalized and administrative challenges for sharing sensitive or classified
information, competent authorities can verify that persons receiving this information have a “need to
know” based on their duties or related work activities. Also, they can require background checks,
security clearance, or trustworthiness verification in accordance with national policy and be given
guidance on how to protect this information from unauthorized disclosure. In addition, there are other
alternatives identified in the lists below. The list identifies current good practices that exist to facilitate
sharing threat information at the State and operator levels. It is not an exhaustive list. The intent is to
share practical examples and alternatives that can enhance cooperation and communication.

E.

Examples of Good Practices at the State Level

Practices

Descriptions and Examples

Institutionalized cooperation
and coordination agreements

Establish good working relationships and arrangements to share
sensitive information between the regulatory body and competent
authorities, especially law enforcement and intelligence services. These
arrangements can be formalized in a memorandum of understanding
or other forms of written arrangements. Similar agreements can be
implemented with industry operators or associations to share
unclassified information. As a result, stakeholders follow national
privacy laws and regulations as well as national security directives and
other administrative and legal provisions.

Establish performance-based
requirements for
trustworthiness verification

In some states, multiple government programs require criminal
background checks. This may be considered as equivalent to
trustworthiness verification for operators. For example, as part of CNSC
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and recognize other
government security
clearance programs

requirements, an individual that has unescorted access to high-risk
radioactive sources needs to have a trustworthiness verification that
includes a criminal record name check. This requirement also
recognizes trusted travelers that undergo an FBI fingerprint verification
and have a NEXUS card, or individuals that undergo criminal record
verifications to get a valid firearms possession and authorization
license.

Public/government security
clearance sponsorship
program for private industry

In Canada and the USA, there is the Information Sharing Network for
Critical Infrastructure Protection that has programs to sponsor security
clearance application from designated members of the industry with a
security responsibility.

The nuclear regulator may also sponsor private organization security
clearance if they have a contractual agreement.

Establishing a National
Nuclear Security Committee
and/or working groups
radioactive material security

Many States have national security committees that include
representatives of industry operators and industry associations to
increase the collaboration, cooperation, communication, and
information for sharing on potential threats.

Participate with international
and national networks that
include industry
representatives

There are many international organizations, such as IAEA, INTERPOL,
Nuclear Security Contact Group, or state intelligence/policing services.
Consideration should be given to using existing information sharing
networks on radioactive materials. For example: Joining the IAEA
Incident Trafficking database (ITDB), participating in the IAEA Working
Group on Radioactive Material Security for national nuclear regulators,
International Sealed Sources Suppliers and Producers Association
(ISSPA), industry radiography associations, World Nuclear Transport
Institute, etc.

There are also national industry associations that can be leveraged to
share information on recent nuclear security events, lessons learned,
and good practices. During these meetings, the competent authority
(ex: regulator or law enforcement agency) can provide unclassified
information on current and emerging threats that can have an impact
on operators.
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Regular outreach,
communication, and
consultation to disseminate
unclassified threat
information

Conduct outreach and communication with relevant stakeholders
periodically or on a regular basis with regard to threat information.
This outreach can include annual or semi-annual intelligence
discussions for staff and industry, conducted at the classified and/or
unclassified level for stakeholder groups. Industry associations can
invite representatives from the regulatory body and law enforcement
to get updates on national threats or events that can have an impact
on their operations.

Declassify sensitive
information to an unclassified
level

To be able to share threat information, law enforcement and
intelligence services invest efforts in removing sensitive details and
personal data to share unclassified information. This method is widely
used to share laterally with other public law enforcement/government
organizations and horizontally with industry security representatives or
senior policy/decision makers. This is one of the most effective means
of sharing threat information in a timely manner.

For international transport,
establish
bilateral/regional/multilateral
agreements for sharing
information between states

Recognition and promotion of cross-border security programs should
be considered; for example, the Canada-USA-Mexico CT-PAT/PIP
program provides benefits to members by getting access to security
assessments and awareness sessions and facilitates international
transport of radioactive materials across borders.

Use pre-established communication methods with the Foreign Affairs
Service for notification of international shipments. For example,
embassy/diplomatic foreign affairs communication channels could be
used to notify states when a shipment of category 1 radioactive
material occurs that impacts their region.

Example: Advance notification of maritime transport shipments to
coastal states – using IAEA networks and nuclear security points of
contacts for international information request.

Example of Good Practices at the Operator Level
Practice

Description and example
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Implement an effective
security program to protect
radioactive materials and
sensitive information

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Comply with national laws, regulations, and security
requirements
Conduct a Threat and Vulnerability Assessment
Establish security and contingency plans
Implement security policies and procedures
Use the information from the national DBT or RTS to assess the
effectiveness of physical protection measures
Establish drills and exercises program
Implement a security awareness program and training
Promote nuclear security culture
Report nuclear security events and other suspicious incidents

Participate industry contact
groups, outreach activities,
teleconferences, and
workshops relevant to
nuclear security for
radioactive materials

These industry associations already exist and are very useful forums to
exchange information. For example: International Sealed Sources
Suppliers and Producers Association (ISSPA), Candu Owner Group
(COG), and Nuclear Power Operations (INPO). There are also
associations for specific industry groups, such as the Canadian Industrial
radiography association (CIRCA), Canadian Radiation Protection
Association (CRPA), etc. In some instance, these groups share sensitive
information among stakeholders, including newsletters and bulletins.

Designate or delegate one
individual or team on how to
handle classified information

A private organization can identify, train, and designate one security
point of contact. This function can also be delegated to another support
group within the organization. This designated officer can undergo the
security clearance process (e.g. trustworthiness verification) to be able
to receive information from other organizations.

Designate a security
outreach officer or point of
contact (e.g. liaison officer)

Some organizations designate a security outreach officer to promote
good security culture within the organization.

Consult and communicate
with local law enforcement
agencies

The local law enforcement agency can provide valuable support,
including information on local crimes and threats. They often publish
reports and criminal statistics, and they can be very useful for alerting
the population in case of life-threatening events.
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Leverage open source
information on nuclear
security

Hire a consultant or analyst or use open source information software
and tools to gather relevant information on threats to physical, cyber,
and personal assets in the nuclear industry.

As mentioned by the World Institute on Nuclear Security [8], “It is the State’s responsibility to obtain,
collate and analyze threat information and ensure it is comprehensive and up-to-date. However,
operators also have valuable contributions to make to the threat assessment due to their specialized
knowledge of transport routes and potential problem areas that should be avoided; consequently, they
should be encouraged to contribute to the process.” The IAEA also published important guidance for
States on the security of nuclear information [5] This document identifies specific considerations for
sharing and disclosing sensitive information. An important guiding principle is the need to balance the
benefit of sharing the information and the need for security. This is a golden rule to ensure organizations
share relevant, accurate, and timely information without compromising confidentiality.

Another good practice is getting law enforcement organizations involved and increasing their awareness
regarding the risks and threats to radioactive materials. Law enforcement communities are a great
resource to share threat information. They are an important player in the nuclear security regime for
response. Typically, law enforcement organizations have competing priorities and need to risk manage
their resources. Operators may find it difficult to communicate with the right law enforcement officer or
to get them involved in alarm response training or site familiarization. The regulator, as a public and
governmental organization, can greatly influence the relationships with police and security forces. To
follow international recommendations, national competent authorities should require operators to
establish arrangements with local law enforcement agencies to facilitate alarm response and to ensure
timely and effective deployment in case of a security event. As mentioned by Mr. John Buchanan [9]
from the radiological and nuclear terrorism prevention unit with Interpol, “Building relationships with all
law enforcement stakeholders to fight the illicit smuggling of radiological and nuclear materials is
essential.” From his perspective, it is important to develop networks and connections and to strengthen
multiagency partnerships to protect nuclear and other radioactive materials.

6. Analysis and Thoughts
The establishment of a “Nuclear Security Culture” is based on a belief that the threat is real and credible.
Therefore, it is important that stakeholders are engaged in this discussion and establish industry contact
groups. An important element of information sharing moves from the state to the operator, but just as
important is information sharing from the operator to the state. For example, it is critical to share
lessons learned from security incidents to enable competent authorities to collect and compile national
threat data and analyze trends, methods, relationships, and hot spots. Security incident reporting by
operators should be encouraged and/or required by the state through regulation. Outreach with the
industry can also be used to share information on radioactive material security and to increase
awareness of relevant stakeholders and decision makers without compromising confidentiality
requirements
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To help users and operators understand what they are protecting against, it is necessary to inform and
educate them about the threats. Radioactive materials are used worldwide in several medical, research,
and industrial sectors; the regulator should focus efforts to target these specific industries and
associations to develop their networks. Communication already exists with licensing and compliance
programs; therefore, nuclear security should be part of the overall communication strategy with
operators.

When competent authorities communicate with operators to share relevant and accurate threat
information effectively, it is important to set objectives and measure their effectiveness to report to
senior and executive managers. This can include direct and indirect benefits in building trustful
relationships with relevant stakeholders.

Operators need to stay vigilant and informed on the motivation, intention, and capacity of the
adversary. Cooperation in this aspect through timely and continuous sharing and dissemination of threat
information is of particular importance to improve radiological security.
To increase prevention and detection of potential adversary attacks on radioactive materials, it is
necessary to test the capacity to share threat information with relevant stakeholders in an effective and
timely manner through regular training, drills, or tabletop exercises. These communication channels are
crucial when a reported security incident occurs, and they help to keep stakeholders and the public
informed.

Finally, to enhance the relationship between nuclear regulators, competent authorities and industry
representatives, in particular operators handling high-risk radioactive materials in the private sector,
should implement institutionalized coordination and cooperation mechanisms. Theses forums should
use contractual relationships [10] with written agreements and a formal memorandum of understanding
to facilitate the exchange of threat information and promote nuclear security culture, good practices,
and lessons learned among relevant industry stakeholders and front-line response organizations.

Communication, coordination, and cooperation are usually shared responsibilities among nuclear
security stakeholders. Therefore, there is a need to unify efforts, get leadership support, and invest
resources at the national level to make a positive change and to strengthen communicating threat
information. These “3 C” principles were identified as keys to secure radioactive material globally at the
International Nuclear Security Conference highlights in 2018. It may be time to move from a “need to
know” approach to a “need to share” threat information between competent authorities and
radioactive materials operators to strengthen communication and trust as well as empower further
cooperation for nuclear security.
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